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Abstract—The phenomenon of Adversarial Examples is at-
tracting increasing interest from the Machine Learning commu-
nity, due to its significant impact to the security of Machine
Learning systems. Adversarial examples are similar (from a
perceptual notion of similarity) to samples from the data dis-
tribution, that “fool” a machine learning classifier. For computer
vision applications, these are images with carefully crafted but
almost imperceptible changes, that are misclassified. In this work,
we characterize this phenomenon under an existing taxonomy
of threats to biometric systems, in particular identifying new
attacks for Offline Handwritten Signature Verification systems.
We conducted an extensive set of experiments on four widely
used datasets: MCYT-75, CEDAR, GPDS-160 and the Brazilian
PUC-PR, considering both a CNN-based system and a system
using a handcrafted feature extractor (CLBP). We found that
attacks that aim to get a genuine signature rejected are easy
to generate, even in a limited knowledge scenario, where the
attacker does not have access to the trained classifier nor the
signatures used for training. Attacks that get a forgery to be
accepted are harder to produce, and often require a higher level
of noise - in most cases, no longer “imperceptible” as previous
findings in object recognition. We also evaluated the impact of
two countermeasures on the success rate of the attacks and the
amount of noise required for generating successful attacks.
Index Terms—Adversarial Machine Learning, Signature Veri-
fication, Biometrics
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric systems are extensively used to establish a per-
son’s identity in legal and administrative tasks [1]. They are
commonly modeled as Pattern Recognition systems, in which
biometric data from an individual is acquired (e.g. during an
enrollment process), and stored as a “template” for future
comparisons, or used to train a classifier that can discriminate
if new samples belong to this user.
The reliability of these systems have security implications,
and in the last decade these systems have been analyzed
from an Adversarial Machine Learning perspective. From
this viewpoint, we consider an active adversary, with its
own goals (e.g. getting access to a system), knowledge (e.g.
knowing the classifier parameters, or the learning algorithm)
and capabilities (e.g. ability to manipulate the training data, or
the inputs during test time). In particular, Ratha et al. [2] and
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later Biggio et al. [3] characterize the different components of
a biometric system that can be attacked.
However, an emerging issue of “Adversarial Examples”
pose new security concerns for such systems. This issue
refers to adversarial input perturbations specially crafted to
induce misclassifications. Szegedy et al. [4] showed that very
small perturbations on images (almost imperceptible) could
be crafted to mislead a state-of-the-art CNN-based classifier.
Moreover, attacks crafted for one model often transfer to other
models, meaning that an attacker could train its own surrogate
classifier to generate attacks, as long as it has access to data
from the same data distribution. This issue has been analyzed
in many recent papers [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], but the theoretical
reasons are not fully understood, and most defenses are weak
(i.e. they fail if the attacker knows about the defense).
We evaluate this new threat for biometric systems, by
characterizing the potential new attacks under a taxonomy of
threats to such systems [2], [3]. We consider particular attack
scenarios to Offline Handwritten Signature Verification, identi-
fying the attacker’s goals, required knowledge and capabilities.
It is worth noting that attacking verification systems can
present difficulties not present in classification problems. In
particular, as new users join the system, they introduce a new
class, not only unseen examples of existing classes. We present
a refined version of the adversary’s knowledge model that
explicitly makes the distinction of whether access to data from
a particular individual of interest is available to the attacker.
We conducted experiments on Writer-Dependent classifiers
trained with a CNN-based representation (SigNet) and a hand-
crafted feature extractor (CLBP), considering four widely used
Datasets: MCYT, CEDAR, GPDS-160 and the Brazilian PUC-
PR. We defined a comprehensive set of experiments to evaluate
such systems under different scenarios of the adversary’s
knowledge level and objectives, using four attack methods
(gradient-based and gradient-free). Our main contributions are
as follows:
• We characterize different attack scenarios for Offline
Handwritten Signature Verification systems, focused on
new threats introduced by Adversarial Examples.
• We identify that there is an asymmetry in the attacks,
empirically showing that attacking genuine signatures (so
that they are rejected) can be done with high success
rate and a relatively low amount of noise, while attacking
forgeries (so that they are accepted) is a much harder.
• Our experiments with different scenarios of attacker
knowledge show that attacks can be done even with
Limited Knowledge, where the attacker has no access to
1556-6013 c©2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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Fig. 1: A typical writer-dependent signature verification system, with annotated points of attack. On the training phase, a
classifier fu is trained for each user. During operations, for a new sample Xnew we obtain a feature vector φ(Xnew), and use the
classifier fu to accept or reject the signature. For adaptive systems, an update rule select signatures for classifier adaptation.
the signatures used to train the classifiers, showing that
this transferability affects both CNN-based systems and
systems based on handcrafted features. We also identify
that attack transferability is greatly reduced if the CNN
is trained on a different subset of users, contrasting with
previous findings that attacks transfer well if the CNN is
trained on a different subset of samples from the same
classes [4].
• Lastly, we evaluate the impact of countermeasures and
find that the Madry defense [10] is effective in increasing
the amount of noise necessary to make a sample adver-
sarial, even when it is applied only to the feature learning
phase, and not on training the WD classifiers. Code for
reproducing the experiments will be made publicly avail-
able at https://github.com/luizgh/adversarial signatures.
The paper is organized as follows: in section II we introduce
the main concepts of security in biometric systems; in section
III we present the issue of adversarial examples and in section
IV we present particular attack scenarios for offline signature
verification, and a refinement of the adversary’s knowledge
model. Section V describes the experimental protocol, and the
results are discussed in section VI. Finally, our conclusions
are listed in section VII.
II. SECURITY IN BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
The security of machine learning systems have been widely
studied in the past decade. Barreno et al. [11], [12] categorize
attacks to such systems along three axes: (i) the influence
of the attack, that can be causative (when training data is
compromised) or exploratory (probing the learner to acquire
information); (ii) the specificity of the attack: targeted, in
which a particular point or a set of points is targeted or in-
discriminate; and (iii) the security violation of the attack, that
can seek an integrity violation (e.g. intrusion) or availability
disruption (e.g. make the system unusable for legitimate users).
Biggio et al. [3], [13] further expands this analysis for
biometric systems, incorporating a model of the adversary
that includes its goals, knowledge of the target system, and
capabilities of manipulating the input data or system com-
ponents. The goals of an attacker are mainly divided in:
1) Denial of service: preventing real users from using the
system; 2) Intrusion: impersonating another user; 3) Privacy
violation: stealing private information from an user (such as
the biometric templates). The knowledge of the adversary
refers to the information of the target system that is available
to the adversary, such as perfect knowledge (e.g. knowledge of
the feature extractor, type of classifier and model parameters)
or limited (partial) knowledge of the system. The capabilities
of the adversary refer to what it can change in the target
system, such as changing the training set (poisoning attack),
or the inputs to the system at test time (evasion attack).
Modeling the knowledge of the adversary was formalized
by Biggio and Roli [14]. Let X and Y be the feature and label
spaces, respectively, and D be a dataset D = {xi, yi}ni=1 of
n training samples. Let f be a training algorithm (classifier),
and w be a collection of its parameters and hyper-parameters.
The knowledge of the attacker can be formalized as a set
θ, containing the components of the system that are known
to the attacker. Perfect-Knowledge (PK) attacks consider full
knowledge of the system, that is, θPK = (D,X , f, w). We
can also consider Limited Knowledge (LK) attacks, in which
some of the information is not available to the adversary. As an
example, if the adversary does not have access to the learned
weights of the model, but has access to the training data, a
surrogate classifier f can be trained (learning parameters wˆ)
and used to generate the attack. Similarly, if the training data
is not available, the adversary may be able to collect another
training set from the same data distribution and use it to train
the surrogate classifier. In this last scenario, the knowledge
of the attacker would be represented as θLK = (Dˆ,X , f, wˆ).
The hat symbol (ˆ ) indicate limited knowledge of a component
(such as getting a surrogate dataset from the same data
distribution).
Biometric systems are composed of several components,
3Original Image Adversarial Noise Adversarial Image
Fig. 2: Illustration of adversarial examples. An adversarial
noise δ is added to original images X , such that the resulting
image X˜ is misclassified. Top: Type-I attack: a genuine
signature from user u1 (left) is attacked to be classified as
a forgery (right). Bottom: Type-II attack. The original image
(left) is from user u2 (i.e. a random forgery for u1), and is
attacked to be classified as a genuine (right).
such as the sensors capturing the biometric, and software to
extract features, store templates and perform classification.
Ratha et al [2] identified eight points of attack on biometric
security systems, that were later grouped by Jain et al [15]
and extended by Biggio et al [3] to include multi-modal
systems and adaptive systems. The set of this attack points
is considered the attack surface of the system. Figure 1
shows a typical User-Dependent classification system, with
the main attack points. Below we discuss the main threats to
the different points of attack.
The first point of attack (#1) in a biometric system is the
user interface that collects the sample (e.g. a scanner capturing
a document with a signature, or a mobile application taking
a picture of a bank cheque). For many biometrics, attacks on
this first point mainly consist of spoofing attacks, that normally
use a fabricated fake biometric trait. Possible defenses for such
attacks rely on liveness detection. On the signature verification
task, simulated and traced forgeries can be considered attacks
targeting this stage. A second set of attack points refer to
attacks in the communication between different components
of the system (#2, #4) (for example, intercepting and replacing
the sensor input or the extracted features, that is input to
the subsequent module). Defenses for such attacks involve
encrypting the communication between the different modules.
The software modules (#1, #3, #5, #6, #7) may present
vulnerabilities in the code (such as buffer overflow) that can be
exploited by a malicious user. The classifier training (#5) can
be targeted for poisoning attacks (e.g. adding samples from
another user in the training data for subsequent intrusion). For
adaptive systems, the template update rule (#7) can be targeted
to update the template database (e.g. for intrusion).
III. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Adversarial examples are samples similar to the true data
distribution, but that fool a classifier. In computer vision, these
are images X˜ that are visually similar to a “real” image X ,
but that fool a classifier (i.e. the classifier predicts an incorrect
class for X˜: argmaxy P (y|X˜) 6= argmaxy P (y|X)).
Szegedy et al. [4] showed that for deep neural networks,
we can run an optimization procedure to produce a small
change δ to an image, such that X˜ = X + δ is an adversarial
example, as illustrated in Figure 2. Perhaps more surprisingly,
they also discovered that an attack that is created to fool one
network also fools other networks (trained on different subsets
of data), meaning that attacks can be created even without full
knowledge of the classifier under attack. It was later shown
that such attacks can be done in the physical world [16], where
adversarial images printed on paper and later captured with a
camera also fooled a classifier. Lastly, although some defense
strategies have been proposed [5], [6], [7], [10], most solutions
are not robust to strong iterative attacks. Even detecting that
an input is adversarial is a hard task [9].
Most of the recent research on this area concentrates on
differentiable classifiers (usually Deep Learning models), cre-
ating attacks that use gradient information of the loss function
with respect to the inputs. However, most feature extractors
used in signature verification (such as LBP, HOG) are non-
differentiable, and therefore attacks to systems using these fea-
tures could not rely on gradient-based methods. Some methods
proposed in the literature do not rely on gradient information,
and could potentially be used for this task. Papernot et al.
proposed Substitute model training [17], in which the attacker
train a substitute (differentiable) model, and use it to generate
the attack. Brendel et al. proposed a Decision-based attack
[18], that relies only on the decision (prediction) of the model
under attack. Its strategy is the opposite of most attacks:
given an image X and an image X˜0 that is from another
class, the algorithm iteratively refines X˜k to be closer to X˜
(e.g. in L2 norm). The image X˜0 can be a random image
(e.g. sampled at random until it is from the desired class), or
an actual image from a target class. Chen et al. proposed a
Zeroth order optimization method [19], where the gradient is
estimated numerically. Doing so naively is impractical (due
to the dimensionality of the input), so the authors employ
techniques to reduce the computational complexity of this
estimation (block coordinate descent, attack-space dimension
reduction, hierarchical attacks and importance sampling). With
all these techniques, the attack has shown to scale to imagenet
(299 × 299 × 3 pixels), producing an attack in 20 minutes.
This method requires the function to be smooth and Lipshitz
continuous. Ilyas et al. proposed using Natural Evolution
Strategy (NES) gradient estimate [20] - instead of using
numerical methods to estimate the gradient (as above), the
authors propose using Natural Evolution Strategies for the
gradient estimate. These estimates are given by computing the
loss function along random directions. The authors claim that
this method require 1-2 orders of magnitude less computations
of the loss function. Lastly, Ramanathan et al. [21] explored
using Simulated annealing for creating adversarial examples
for a system based on HOG features with a linear SVM
classifier. In each iteration, a small perturbation is applied to
the image, and the distance of the new image to the SVM
hyperplane is used as a condition to accept the new point.
4With this approach the authors were able to craft adversarial
images with imperceptible noise that fooled the HOG+SVM
classifier.
A. Attacks considered in this paper
In this paper, we consider two gradient-based attacks (that
can be used when the classifiers are differentiable with respect
to the input), and two gradient-free attacks, that can be used
even if the features and/or classifiers are non-differentiable. In
this paper we are mostly interested in feature extractors widely
used for signature verification, and chose the LBP descriptor,
which is used in several studies [22], [23], [24]. Since LBP
is highly discontinuous (due to the thresholding using the
center pixel’s value), methods that estimate the gradient are
less interesting: the gradient should be very discontinuous (0
almost everywhere), since for each pixel, the transition from
one pattern to the other is a step function. For this reason
we selected two methods that do not rely on estimating the
gradients: the decision-based attack [18] and the optimization
using Simulated annealing. For the gradient-based attacks,
we considered the Fast Gradient Method (FGM) [5] and the
Carlini & Wagner attack [8].
The decision-based attack [18] is an iterative method: given
an image X from class yi, the objective is to find an image
X˜k that is classified as a different class, and minimizes the
distance D(X, X˜k) for some distance measure. It starts with
a sample X˜0 from a class y 6= yi. In each step, first the
sample is projected in a random direction that is orthogonal
to (X˜k−1−X) (i.e. orthogonal to a straight line to the sample
X), and then takes a step in the direction of X . If the point is
still from a class different than yi, it is accepted as the next
point X˜k, otherwise a new point is searched in another random
direction. This method therefore only requires the decision of
the model (which class a sample X˜k belongs to).
The annealing method uses the well known simulated
annealing method as a gradient-free optimization method.
Starting from the image X , we add a small perturbation
obtaining X˜k. If the resulting image is closer to the deci-
sion boundary of the SVM (i.e the score decreases/increases
depending on the type of attack), it is accepted as the next
point. Otherwise, with a probability inversely proportional to
the current step, it is still accepted as the next point. In the
work from Ramanathan et al. [21], the authors consider as
the objective function simply to reduce the distance to the
SVM hyperplane, and stop optimization when the boundary is
crossed. In our experiments, we found it necessary to include
a penalty on the L2 norm of the noise added to the image.
This is further detailed in section V.
The FGM attack is a one-step gradient-based attack. In this
paper we consider the version of this attack focused on the
L2 norm:
X˜ = X + 
∇J(x, y)
‖∇J(x, y)‖2
(1)
Where X is the original image, ∇J(x, y) is the gradient
of the loss function with respect to the input, and  is a
hyperparameter that controls the size of the update. The
adversarial image is then clipped to the allowed range of the
input (e.g. pixels between 0 and 255).
The Carlini & Wagner L2 attack uses an iterative gradient
attack, using a gradient descent method (the Adam optimizer).
The objective to be minimized contains two terms: a term
minimizing the noise δ and a term encouraging the model to
misclassify the image:
min
w
‖δ‖2 + cf(X + δ) (2)
Where c trades-off between the two objectives, and is chosen
with a binary search (the smallest c that still obtains a
misclassified image). Instead of enforcing hard constraints on
the adversarial image (to keep pixel values between 0 and
255), the authors propose a change of variable. First, they
consider images normalized between 0 and 1. Then, to enforce
that X + δ ∈ [0, 1] they consider the following change of
variable:
δi =
1
2
(tanh(wi) + 1)− xi (3)
Since −1 ≤ tanh(wi) ≤ 1, it follows that 0 ≤ Xi + δ1 ≤
1, satisfying the box constraints on the resulting image, but
putting no constraints on the variable under optimization (w).
As for the term that encourages the model to misclassify the
image, they choose a term that seeks to increase the distance
between the logits (pre-softmax activation) of the target class
t and the class with maximum prediction (other than the target
class):
f(X) = max(max
i 6=t
(Z(X)i)− Z(X)t,−κ) (4)
Where Z(X) is the logit (pre-softmax activation) and κ is a
constant that can be used to select how confident the model
must be in the wrong class prediction. This loss function
has no constraints, and can be solved by any gradient-based
method.
B. Countermeasures
Under a paradigm of Security by design, systems should
be designed to be secure from the ground up. In the case
of Machine Learning, systems should be designed explicitly
considering an adversary [14]. Dalvi et al [25] presented one
of the first formulations of this problem, by considering a
game between the classifier and the adversary. They propose a
solution of this game for naive bayes classifiers, considering a
classifier that performs as well as possible against an optimal
adversary. This has some resemblance to recent approaches
proposed for adversarial examples called Adversarial Training
[5], [7], in which the training procedure is augmented with ad-
versarial samples, with the objective of increasing robustness
of the systems.
In this work we are concerned with the new vulnerabilities
introduced by adversarial changes in the input images that
induce misclassifications in Signature Verification systems. In
this setting, some defenses become harder to implement -
for instance, Biggio et al [26] propose learning the support
5(P (X)) and incorporating this knowledge on the classifier
training. Learning this support when X is high dimensional
(which is the case in signature images, eg. 150 × 200 pixels
in this work) is a hard task, specially when just a few samples
per user are available. The problem of working with large
models and input dimensions is explored in recent work in
adversarial examples for deep neural networks. For instance by
Adversarial training [5], [7]; defensive distilation (retraining a
network with knowledge extract from a previous training) [6];
and techniques to add non-differentiable steps in the inference
process (e.g. transforming the input with non-differentiable
operations [27]). Most defenses, however, have been shown
to fail when the attacker has knowledge of them. Tramer
et al. [7] showed that Adversarial training is not robust to
iterative attacks on a white-box (PK) scenario; Carlini and
Wagner showed that distillation is also not effective in this
scenario [8]. More recently, Athalye et al. showed that almost
all defenses presented in recent ICLR and CVPR conferences
can be bypassed [28], [29]. The only exception was the
work of Madry et al. [10], that propose a framework that
provides guarantees against attacks with a maximum L∞
norm. However, as noted in [29], this defense is hard to scale
(the authors only reported results on the CIFAR-10 dataset,
which consists of small images of 32 × 32 pixels), and that
resistance to L∞ attacks does not guarantee resistance to other
scenarios (e.g. when the attacker is limited by a maximum L2
norm of the noise). This problem therefore remains as an open
research question.
In this paper we focus our attention in defenses for the
CNN-based models, in particular by evaluating two defenses:
Ensemble Adversarial Training [7] and the Madry defense
[10]. The first has demonstrated some robustness in Limited
Knowledge scenarios, while the second is a proposed defense
against perfect-knowledge attacks.
For the ensemble adversarial training, we first train M
models on the task at hand. Then we train another model with
the following loss function:
J˜(X, y, θ) = αJ(X, y, θ) + (1− α)J(X˜, y, θ) (5)
Where J(X, y, θ) is the cross-entropy loss function of a
sample X with true label y, and X˜ is an adversarial sample
generated using FGM (equation 1) either using the model
being trained, or one of the M previously trained models.
The Madry defense involves a saddle point optimization
problem, in which we optimize for the worst case:
min
θ
p(θ)
where p(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
J(X + δ, y, θ)
] (6)
Where S defines a feasible region of the attack (i.e. the attacker
capability). For instance, to add robustness against attacks that
minimize the L2 norm of the attacks, we train the classifier
with an adversary constrained to S = {δ : ‖δ‖2 < }, for a
given maximum perturbation .
Lastly, we also consider a countermeasure using background
removal. Handwritten data has an important difference com-
pared to other vision tasks, such as object recognition, where
we have a clear and simple separation of background and fore-
ground. This is an important distinction because adversarial
samples usually involve adding a crafted “noise” all around
the image. To this end, we investigate the impact (on the attack
success rate) of removing the background after the adversarial
samples are generated.
IV. ATTACK SCENARIOS FOR OFFLINE HANDWRITTEN
SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
We now consider the possible attacks to biometric systems
based on adversarial examples X˜ . In particular, we identify
possible attack points, and provide specific scenarios for
Offline Handwritten Signature Verification.
The attacks using adversarial examples involve changing the
inputs to the classifier, and therefore we identify two potential
areas of vulnerability: at the sensor level, or the template
storage/update level. The most prominent aspect of adversarial
examples is that they fool a machine learning system without
fooling humans (i.e. X˜ being visually similar to X). This is
an important difference to spoofing attacks (that also target
the sensor level), since these fake biometric traits, such as a
“gummy finger”, are clearly identified as different from a real
finger by a human. We identify the following new attacks on
signature verification systems, along with possible goals of an
attacker:
1) Attacks on the data capture (targets point #1). In this
case the adversarial image is crafted before the image is
collected for the system. That is, an adversary can craft
adversarial images X˜ , and present them to the system,
for instance using a banking application that allows a
customer to use a picture of a cheque to cash it; or by
printing adversarial noise on a physical signature. We
identify two types of attack:
• Type-I attack (false rejection): Present a genuine
signature that fools the system as being a forgery.
This can be used for denial of service (preventing
genuine users to accessing a system). We can also
make a parallel to disguised signatures, where the
user signs a document with the intent of later
denying it (for example, the receiver of a check
accepts it, but fails to cash it as the system classifies
it is a forgery).
• Type-II attack (false acceptance): Present a random
forgery (i.e. a genuine signature from user yi) that
fools the system as being genuine for user yj (j 6=
i). At the same time, to a person, this sample can
show no signs of being forgery (if it is not compared
to a reference), since it is a genuine signature. The
attacker can also use a skilled forgery as “starting
point”, creating noise to increase the likelihood of
the forgery being accepted.
2) Attacks on the templates (targets point #5): If original
images are stored as part of the system (e.g. for classifier
re-training, or manual verification in case of system
failure/rejection of a sample), the templates can be
changed to still look like genuine signatures for human
6operators, but in a way that accept signatures from a
different person as genuine.
3) Attack on template update (targets point #7): For
adaptive systems, the attacker can craft changes on
the user’s signature, so that adversarial templates are
added to the gallery, to enable an intrusion later using a
signature from another person. Similarly to the point
above, the templates would appear as genuine to a
person.
The attacks above require different capabilities from the part
of the attacker. The first attack only affects the system at test
time (evasion attack), and in many practical scenarios would
require the creation of a physical attack, that is, the creation
of an adversary signature in a piece of paper, for instance by
printing adversarial noise on top of a handwritten signature.
The second attack is a poisoning attack, that does not require
a physical sample, as it impacts the stored templates of an
user. However, it requires the capability of the attacker to
update the template database, and can be categorized as an
insider attack as per the terminology used by Biggio et al
[3]. Note that this attack differ from simply adding another
user’s biometric to the templates, since a manual inspection
of the templates would not reveal that the templates have been
tampered with. The third attack can also be seen as a poisoning
attack, affecting adaptive systems, that automatically add new
samples to the set of user templates.
As for the knowledge required from the adversary, we can
consider different scenarios, ranging from full knowledge of
the system, to scenarios where only limited information is
available to the attacker.
A. Refining the adversary’s knowledge model
For biometric verification tasks, we identify an important
refinement of the adversary’s knowledge model. We argued in
section II that an adversary that does not have access to the
training set can collect its own data Dˆ from the same data
distribution, and train a surrogate classifier. For verification
systems, each new user to the system effectively introduces a
new class, and therefore it is important to make a distinction
of accessing data for a particular individual of interest, and a
“background class”, that are negative examples for a given user
(e.g. signatures from other users). We refer therefore to two
data components: Db - biometric data from the background
class (i.e. not for the individual under attack), and Du -
biometric data from the targeted individual. This allows the
definition of limited knowledge scenarios where the biometric
sample of the user can be collected, or for scenarios where
the adversary can only collect samples from a other users.
In our experiments, we consider three attack scenarios:
• Perfect Knowledge scenario: the attacker has knowledge
of all components: θPK = (Db,Du,X , f, w). This sce-
nario serves as a tool to analyze the worst-case scenario
(from the system’s defense perspective).
• Limited Knowledge #1: we consider a scenario where
the attacker does not have access to the dataset used
for training the classifiers, but has access to all other
components. We consider that the attacker is able to
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Fig. 3: Dataset separation for the MCYT dataset. The set Du
is used for training the classifiers under attack, and the sets Dˆb
and Dˆu are used by the attacker to train surrogate classifiers.
collect signatures from some users (Dˆb, that are from
different users from those used to train the system), and
some signatures from the user of interest, that were not
used for training the system: Dˆu. In this case, θLK1 =
(Dˆb, Dˆu,X , f, wˆ).
• Limited Knowledge #2: similarly to the above, but we
consider a scenario where the attacker does not have full
access to the feature extraction function (that induces the
space X ). In particular, we consider a scenario where the
attacker does not have access to the CNN model that was
used to extract the features, but trains its own CNN (with
identical training procedure and architecture) on a differ-
ent set of users. In this case, θLK2 = (Dˆb, Dˆu, Xˆ , f, wˆ).
V. EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
We conducted experiments using the datasets MCYT-75
[30] (with 75 users), CEDAR [31] (55 users), GPDS-160 [32]
(160 users) and the Brazilian PUC-PR [33] (60 users).
In order to simulate the different attack scenarios we split
the dataset into two parts of disjoint users, as illustrated in
Figure 3. The set D refers to the users “enrolled in the system”,
that will be under attack. This dataset is divided in training
(user signatures Du) and testing T . For the limited knowledge
scenarios, we consider a set Dˆb that contains signatures from
other users (not those being attacked), simulating the scenario
of an attacker that acquired his own signature dataset in order
to generate the attacks. We also consider that the attacker has
access to some signatures from the user, Dˆu, that were not
used for training the system (i.e. disjoint from Du and T ).
The images were pre-processed in a similar way to [34]:
Signatures were first centered in a blank canvas using their
center of mass. We then resize the images to 150×220 pixels
and invert the image such that the background pixels are zero-
valued. Lastly, we run the OTSU algorithm to identify the
optimal threshold that separates background and foreground.
We set the pixels with intensity smaller than the threshold to
intensity 0, leaving the remaining pixels in grayscale.
We consider Writer-Dependent classifiers, training an SVM
(linear or with the RBF kernel) for each user. As feature
extraction φ(X), we consider: (i) a CNN-based learned repre-
sentation: SigNet [34], and (ii) the CLBP operator (Completed
Local Binary Patterns)[35]. We train the SVMs with 5 genuine
7signatures from the user as positive samples, and 5 signatures
from each other user as negative.
For the scenario LK2, we consider two CNN models with
the same architecture and training procedures, but trained on a
disjoint set of users. The CNN used by the model under attack
was trained on GPDS users 350-614, and the CNN used by the
surrogate models (by the attacker) were trained with users 615-
881. Training procedure followed the same as SigNet [34]. For
the Ensemble Adversarial Learning evaluation, we first trained
two models with different architectures (slight variations from
SigNet, as described in the Supplemental Material) and then
trained a model with the SigNet architecture and the loss
function defined in equation 5, with  = 5. For the Madry
defense, we also used the same architecture, and trained with
S = {δ : ‖δ‖2 < } with  = 2. We tried using larger values
for  and obtained worse classification performance during
the CNN training, so these values represent a tradeoff between
robustness and accuracy. In both cases, we trained the network
with users 350-614, to enable evaluating the scenario LK2. In
this scenario, we consider an attacker that trained a regular
CNN (no adversarial training), with users 615-881.
After training the classifiers for each user, the SVMs im-
plement the following decision functions:
sLinear = wᵀφ(X) + b (7)
sRBF =
∑
i∈S
αi exp(−γ ‖φ(X)−Xi‖) + b (8)
Where sLinear and sRBF are the scores for the linear SVM and
the SVM with the RBF kernel, respectively; w are the weights
learned by the linear SVM, S is the set of support vectors,
αi and Xi are the coefficients and support vectors, γ is a
hyperparameter for the RBF kernel and b is the bias. We can
easily see that both functions are differentiable with respect
to φ(X) [26]. For the classifier using a CNN-based model
to extract the features, we can calculate the gradients of the
scores w.r.t the inputs X, and apply gradient-based methods to
generate the attacks. For non-differentiable feature extractors,
we consider only the two gradient-free methods described in
section III-A. When reporting the scores in Figures 2, 4 and 5,
we consider a normalized loss as follows: s˜(X) = s(X)− τ ,
where τ is the global threshold. This makes it easy to identify
if a signature would be classified as genuine or as a forgery
(s˜(X) ≥ 0 indicates the prediction of X being a genuine
signature).
For the classifiers using LBP, we consider the the operator
CLBP S/M/C [35] (3D histogram of CLBP S, M and C),
with the following parameters: R = 1 (radius of 1 pixel),
P = 8 (eight neighbors) and rotation invariant uniform pat-
terns (“riu2”). The feature vector has a total of 200 dimensions.
To simplify the generation of the attacks we considered a
global threshold for the classifications, that obtained the Equal
Error Rate on the set D (without any attacks).
After the classifiers are trained, we generate attacks using
the four methods described in section III-A. We used the FGM
method with  = 1000, and the Carlini & Wagner attack
with κ = 1. For the Decision-based attack, we considered
the implementation from the authors1, running the attack for
a maximum of 1000 iterations. For the Simulated Annealing
method, we considered an open implementation of simulated
annealing2. In each iteration, we change the state by adding
gaussian noise  ( ∼ N (0, σI), with σ = 2), and clipping
the image between 0 and 255. We consider the energy to
be a mixture of the SVM score and the L2 norm of the
adversarial noise δ: E = s(X) + λ ‖δ‖2, with λ = 0.001
being a trade-off between changing the SVM score, and not
deviating too far from the original image. We used an initial
temperature Tmax = 1 and final temperature Tmin = 0.001.
These values were chosen such that around 95% of the steps
that would increase the energy are still accepted in the start of
the procedure, and less than 5% were accepted in the end. We
ran this procedure with at most 1000 steps, with early stopping
(we stop optimization if the image is adversarial).
The experiments consisted in Type-I attacks (attempting to
have a genuine signature rejected by the system) and Type-II
attacks (attempting to have a forgery accepted by the system).
For each user, we selected one genuine signature, one random
forgery and one skilled forgery, such that all four classifiers
correctly classified these samples. We then used the different
attack methods to generate adversarial samples, and measured
the attack success rate (number of misclassified images after
the attack), and the average RMSE (root mean square error) of
the adversarial noise on successful attacks. It is worth noting
that we consider pixel values in the range [0, 255], so the
RMSE of the adversarial noise is also constrained in the same
range. To summarize the experiments, we considered:
• Datasets: MCYT-75, CEDAR, GPDS-160, Brazilian
PUC-PR
• Feature extractor: CLBP, SigNet
• SVM type: Linear, RBF
• Attack method: Decision-based, Simulated Annealing,
FGM, Carlini
• Attacker’s goal: Type-I (attacking Genuine signatures)
and Type-II (attacking Random and Skilled forgeries),
• Attacker’s knowledge: Perfect Knowledge, Limited
Knowledge LK1 and LK2
• Defense: No defense, Ens. Adv. training, Madry
It is worth mentioning that in this work we did not consider
the discretization of the generated adversarial images. We
worked with images in float format, instead of discretized into
integers between 0 and 255. This is discussed in section VI-F.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Before presenting the results of the attacks, we first val-
idate the performance of the WD classifiers on the four
datasets. Table I shows the EER obtained by using different
features/classifiers, when trained with 5 reference signatures
per user, with the protocol defined in section V. We observe
a large variance in the results across different datasets, which
suggests different degrees of difficulty on separating genuine
signatures and forgeries in them. We also observe a large
difference of performance between systems trained with the
1https://github.com/bethgelab/foolbox
2https://github.com/perrygeo/simanneal
8TABLE I: Results of WD classifiers using different feature
sets (EER considering skilled forgeries)
Dataset Features EER global-τ EER user-τ
Linear RBF Linear RBF
MCYT-75 SigNet 7.12 7.03 7.39 5.68
CLBP 26.49 27.03 27.21 26.85
CEDAR SigNet 12.03 11.82 6.01 4.52
CLBP 28.01 21.36 23.95 16.39
GPDS Signet 7.70 6.80 4.62 4.14
CLBP 26.74 24.58 21.79 22.37
Brazilian PUC-PR SigNet 6.78 5.22 3.61 2.67
CLBP 26.83 19.61 24.61 16.83
TABLE II: Success rate of Type-I attacks (% of attacks that
transformed a genuine signature in a forgery)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 63.16 80.70
CLBP RBF - - 100.00 100.00
SigNet Linear 99.42 100.00 98.83 100.00
SigNet RBF 98.25 100.00 98.83 100.00
SigNet and CLBP features. In order to have a fair analysis
of the adversarial examples against each classifier/feature
extractor, we select the same set of images for the attacks
on all classifiers, ensuring that the original images (before
the attack) were correctly classified by them. Although the
classifier performance varies across different datasets, the
results for the adversarial attacks showed consistent trends
across them. In this paper we report the consolidated results
over the four datasets, and for completeness we include the
results on individual datasets in the Supplementary Material.
A. Perfect Knowledge
We consider first a scenario of Perfect Knowledge, in which
the adversary has full knowledge of all components of the
system: θPK = (Db,Du,X , f, w). The attacker can run his
own copy of the system, and use one of the proposed attacks
to generate adversarial images.
For Type-I attacks, given a genuine sample Xg , the objective
is to obtain an adversarial X˜ = Xg + δ that is classified as
a forgery. Table II shows the success rate of attacks in this
scenario (i.e. the percentage of attacks that found an adversary
image), by attack type and classifier type. We see a high
success rate for most attacks. Table III shows the average
RMSE (root mean squared error) of the adversarial noise δ.
We notice that the required amount of noise varies significantly
with different classifiers and attack types. In general, gradient-
based attacks find adversarial images with much less noise on
TABLE III: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for
successful Type-I attacks
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 0.40 1.57
CLBP RBF - - 0.36 10−9
SigNet Linear 4.04 1.35 5.69 3.27
SigNet RBF 4.06 1.40 5.17 3.02
(a) Carlini (s˜ = −0.69, RMSE
2.46)
(b) FGM (s˜ = −0.79, RMSE
3.48)
(c) Decision (s˜ = −0.65, RMSE
6.21)
(d) Anneal (s˜ = −0.62, RMSE
7.66)
Fig. 4: Example of Type-I attacks on the SVM model with
RBF kernel and SigNet features. The original image is cor-
rectly classified as genuine by this model (s˜ = 0.13).
(a) Decision (s˜ = −0.39, RMSE
0.99)
(b) Anneal (s˜ = −0.27, RMSE
0.21)
Fig. 5: Example of Type-I attacks on the SVM model with
Linear kernel and CLBP features. The original image is
correctly classified as genuine by this model (s˜ = 1.60).
the differentiable models. For the models with handcrafted
features (where we do not have gradients), we noticed that
even smaller changes on the image were enough to induce
a misclassification. Figures 4 and 5 present examples of this
type of attack.
We now consider Type-II attacks, in which we want to
modify a forgery Xf , by creating an adversary X˜ = Xf + δ
that is classified as a genuine signature. Table IV shows the
TABLE IV: Success rate of Type-II attacks (% of attacks that
transformed a forgery in a genuine signature)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 37.36 45.98
skilled - - 38.73 46.24
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 1.15 96.55 0.00 0.00
skilled 28.90 99.42 2.31 3.47
SigNet RBF random 0.57 94.83 0.00 0.00
skilled 19.65 100.00 1.73 1.73
9TABLE V: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for
successful Type-II attacks
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 0.39 1.17
skilled - - 0.42 1.08
SigNet Linear random 4.11 6.07 - -
skilled 4.20 3.19 3.61 1.34
SigNet RBF random 4.70 6.55 - -
skilled 4.08 3.62 3.17 1.18
success rate of the different methods, and table V shows the
level of noise required in the successful attacks. The results
show that this attack is much harder to obtain compared to the
Type-I attacks. For the models trained with CLBP features,
we observed that the linear classifier could be attacked half
of the time, while we could not generate any attack using the
two gradient-free methods for the non-linear model. For the
CNN-based models, a strong gradient-based method (Carlini)
worked for almost all samples, while the gradient-free methods
did not work in most cases - we only observed some success
when using skilled forgeries as the starting point. Compar-
ing tables III and V, we observe that for the CLBP-based
classifiers, a similar amount of noise was required to create
successful attacks. For the CNN-based methods, when starting
from a random forgery a large amount of noise was required to
create successful attacks, while when starting from a skilled
forgery a lower amount of noise was required. We reiterate
that the skilled forgeries selected for attack were correctly
classified by the model (i.e. classified as forgeries), while
in successful attacks the adversarial image is classified as a
genuine.
It is worth noting that in the experiments with the strong
gradient-based attack, we observed a much larger amount
of noise required for misclassification compared to previous
results reports on object recognition. For instance, in the
classification task on ImageNet, successful attacks (using the
same Carlini & Wagner method) are reported with much lower
noise (RMSE of 0.004 for 100% success of targeted attacks
on ImageNet [8]). While for object recognition the adversarial
images are often perceptually identical to the original, for
signatures we noted some distinguishable noise, specially on
the Type-II attacks, as can be seen in figure 2 (where the
Type-II attack has RMSE of 10.34).
B. Limited Knowledge #1
We now consider a limited knowledge scenario, where
the attacker does not have access to the signatures used
for training the system, but does obtain a surrogate dataset:
θLK1 = (Dˆb, Dˆu,X , f, wˆ). In this case, the signatures from
the background set (used as negative samples during training)
were from a different set of users than those used to train
the system. We also consider that the attacker collected some
signatures from the user of interest Dˆu, but that are also
different from those used to train the system. This scenario also
assumes that the attacker knows the feature extractor (i.e. full
knowledge of the feature extractor, including all parameters),
TABLE VI: Success rate of Type-I attacks (% of attacks
that transformed a genuine signature in a forgery) (Limited
Knowledge)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 42.69 43.86
CLBP RBF - - 82.46 82.46
SigNet Linear 97.08 80.12 50.88 40.35
SigNet RBF 97.66 91.81 54.39 47.95
TABLE VII: Success rate of Type-II attacks (% of attacks
that transformed a forgery in a genuine signature) (Limited
Knowledge)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 24.71 28.74
skilled - - 21.97 26.01
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 0.00 46.55 0.00 0.00
skilled 22.54 71.68 1.73 0.00
SigNet RBF random 0.00 74.71 0.00 0.00
skilled 19.08 83.24 0.58 0.00
and the learning function (the WD classifier type, but not the
learned parameters). In this scenario, the attacker uses the
surrogate data to train their own version of the WD classifiers,
and uses this classifier to generate the attacks. We then evaluate
the success rate of these attacks on the actual system.
Table VI shows the success rate of the Type-I attacks.
We observe a lower success rate compared to the perfect
knowledge scenario, but still we find a high success rate
against most models. This suggests that indeed there is a
transferability of attacks across models (as observed before in
CNNs [4]), and that this transferability also impacts systems
trained with handcrafted features.
Table VII shows the success rate for Type-II attacks in a
limited knowledge scenario. Again we see a drop in perfor-
mance compared to the perfect knowledge scenario, but still
the attacks that worked in the PK scenario also worked (to
some extent) in the limited knowledge scenario.
C. Limited Knowledge #2
We now consider a limited knowledge scenario similar to
the above, but where the attacker also does not have access to
the CNN used to extract the features. In this case, we consider
that the attacker trains a surrogate CNN using a disjoint set
of users, which induces a new feature space Xˆ . We consider
therefore θLK2 = (Dˆb, Dˆu, Xˆ , f, wˆ).
TABLE VIII: Success rate of Type-I attacks (% of attacks
that transformed a genuine signature in a forgery) (Limited
Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
SigNet Linear 60.34 6.90 48.85 19.54
SigNet RBF 64.37 9.20 51.15 18.97
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TABLE IX: Success rate of Type-II attacks (% of attacks
that transformed a forgery in a genuine signature) (Limited
Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
SigNet Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 2.30 2.30 0.57 0.57
SigNet RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 1.72 1.72 1.15 0.00
Tables VIII IX show the success rate of the Type-I and
Type-II attacks, respectively. We observe much lower success
rates, especially for Type-II attacks, where no attacks were
successful when starting from a random forgery, and starting
with a skilled forgery the success was as low as 1-2%. For
the Type-I attacks, we notice lower success rates compared
to the PK and LK1 scenarios. Overall, these results suggest
that transferability of the attacks is much worse when the
models are trained with a different subset of users, that is,
when the attacker does not have access to signatures from
the same users that were used to train the CNN model.
This contrasts with findings in object classification, where
attacks trained on a subset of data transfer well to a model
trained with another subset of data (different samples from
the same classes) [4]. Also, it is worth noting that the strong
Carlini attack (that achieves close to 100% success in the
Perfect Knowledge scenario) drops in performance in the
LK scenarios, confirming previous findings that such iterative
attacks transfer less than single-step attacks such as FGM [36].
D. Evaluating countermeasures
We now consider the impact of two counter-measures for
the CNN-based systems: Ensemble Adversarial Learning [7]
and the Madry defense [10]. Tables X and XI show the success
rate and distortion (RMSE) for Type-I attacks. We consider the
three Knowledge scenarios discussed in section IV-A (Perfect
Knowledge and two Limited Knowledge scenarios), and the
two gradient-based attacks (FGM and Carlini). We notice that
both defenses provide some robustness against the FGM attack
in all knowledge scenarios. Considering the Carlini attack, we
see that in a Perfect-Knowledge scenario the attack was always
successful, but Table XI shows that the Madry defense greatly
increase the amount of noise required to generate adversarial
examples, going from a RMSE of 1.4 to around 3.3.
Tables XII and XIII shows the results on Type-II attacks.
In these experiments, we again observe that the Carlini attack
finds attacks most of the time, and that the Madry defense
showed to be effective in increasing the amount of noise
required to obtain an adversarial example (e.g. the average
RMSE is increased from 5.98 to 10.81 when starting with
a random forgery, comparing the baseline and the Madry
defense). It is worth noting that the RMSE values only
consider the successful attacks, and therefore the results on the
Limited Knowledge scenarios (where the success rate is very
low) are likely skewed by a few forgeries that were already
close to the decision boundary.
E. Impact of background removal
We now investigate the impact of simple noise-reduction
techniques on the success of the attacks. Starting from the ad-
versarial examples found in the experiments from the previous
section, we applied the OTSU algorithm to remove noise with
intensity lower than a threshold (as described in section V).
We then evaluate if the resulting image remains adversarial.
Tables XIV and XV evaluate the impact of processing the
adversarial images with OTSU on the success rate of the at-
tacks, for Type-I and Type-II attacks, respectively. We noticed
that this pre-processing was effective against the gradient-
free attacks, and provided some reduction in the success rate
using gradient-based attacks. A possible explanation for this
difference is that on the gradient-free methods used in these
experiments, only small changes to a random set of pixels in
done in each iteration, while the gradient-based methods can
select larger changes to a smaller set of pixels (the regions
where we have a large gradient of the loss w.r.t to the pixels).
F. Limitations and practical considerations
In this work we evaluated different attack scenarios (knowl-
edge and capabilities for the attacker), but we would like to
highlight some practical aspects to take into consideration for
actual attacks:
• Discretization: In this work, we use images in floating
point representation, which is appropriate for the opti-
mization methods. Images are commonly stored in 8-bits
per channel (i.e. pixels intensities that are integer values
Xij ∈ {0, ..., 255}). Simply rounding the pixel intensities
to the nearest integer degrades the quality of adversarial
examples. An alternative is to conduct a greedy search
(changing each pixel at a time and checking if the im-
age is still adversarial). This solution is computationally
intensive, but can solve the problem (Carlini et al. [8]
reported success with this search - i.e. by using this
method, the discretized version of an adversarial image
is still adversarial, for all images). For figures 4 and 5
we used the discretized images (and reported the score
and RMSE using the discretized version of the images),
so this step mainly adds more computational complexity
for the attacker.
• Physical Attacks: We considered only attacks using
digital images (i.e. after the sensor acquisition) which
are limited for scenarios where digital images are used:
services where the client provides a digital image (e.g.
an app where the user scans a picture of a bank cheque).
It has been shown that physical attacks are possible
[16], [37], where adversarial images were printed, subse-
quently captured using a camera, and still fooled classi-
fiers. However, this often requires more noise to be added,
to account to transformations such as slight rotations or
translations of the image. Also, it is worth noting that,
if noise is printed on top of a handwritten signature, the
noise δ needs to be constrained to be positive. In some
early experiments in this scenario, we found it to also
require more noise (50% higher RMSE) than if δ does
not have this constraint.
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TABLE X: Success rate of Type-I attacks considering different defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
Baseline Linear 100.00 95.40 60.34 100.00 78.16 6.90
RBF 100.00 97.70 64.37 100.00 85.63 9.20
Ens. Adv Linear 91.38 85.63 45.40 100.00 79.89 4.60
RBF 90.23 83.91 46.55 100.00 90.23 5.75
Madry Linear 91.38 83.33 22.99 100.00 74.71 1.72
RBF 89.08 86.21 21.84 100.00 89.08 0.57
TABLE XI: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for Type-I attacks, considering different defenses and attacker knowledge
scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
Baseline Linear 4.17 4.19 4.30 1.31 1.33 1.37
RBF 4.20 4.21 4.30 1.40 1.38 1.55
Ens. Adv. SigNet & Linear 4.37 4.30 4.20 1.35 1.43 1.85
RBF 4.36 4.32 4.20 1.44 1.43 1.63
Madry SigNet & Linear 4.76 4.72 4.26 3.19 3.28 1.59
RBF 4.77 4.74 4.27 3.48 3.52 2.19
TABLE XII: Success rate of Type-II attacks considering different defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
Baseline Linear random 2.87 1.15 0.00 98.85 42.53 0.00
skilled 40.80 29.31 2.30 100.00 66.67 2.30
RBF random 1.72 1.15 0.00 95.98 68.39 0.00
skilled 34.48 27.59 1.72 100.00 83.91 1.72
Ens. Adv. Linear random 1.72 0.57 0.00 93.10 41.38 0.00
skilled 29.31 14.94 1.15 100.00 64.37 3.45
RBF random 2.30 0.00 0.00 93.10 69.54 0.00
skilled 22.99 17.24 1.15 100.00 83.91 2.30
Madry Linear random 1.72 0.57 0.00 98.28 45.98 0.00
skilled 48.85 38.51 8.05 100.00 73.56 3.45
RBF random 2.30 0.57 0.00 97.70 75.86 0.00
skilled 45.98 37.36 6.32 100.00 87.93 2.87
TABLE XIII: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for Type-II attacks, considering different defenses and attacker
knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
Baseline Linear random 3.97 3.75 - 5.98 5.71 -
skilled 4.21 4.14 4.24 2.99 2.71 2.43
RBF random 3.84 3.83 - 6.27 6.03 -
skilled 4.11 4.06 4.64 3.32 3.20 1.77
Ens. Adv. Linear random 4.51 4.82 - 8.61 8.83 -
skilled 4.53 4.58 4.09 4.71 4.34 1.43
RBF random 4.40 - - 9.45 9.31 -
skilled 4.59 4.58 4.07 5.43 4.82 2.14
Madry Linear random 4.74 5.38 - 10.81 10.97 -
skilled 4.90 4.93 4.15 6.18 5.87 1.94
RBF random 4.62 5.28 - 11.49 11.46 -
skilled 4.91 4.88 4.16 7.00 6.71 2.40
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TABLE XIV: Success of Type-I attacks in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with OTSU pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier
CLBP Linear - - - - 63.16 9.36 80.70 3.51
RBF - - - - 100.00 0.58 100.00 0.00
SigNet baseline Linear 100.00 88.51 100.00 18.39 96.55 0.57 100.00 1.72
RBF 100.00 86.21 100.00 22.41 98.28 0.00 98.85 0.57
SigNet Ens. Adv. Linear 91.38 67.24 100.00 2.87 97.70 0.00 100.00 0.00
RBF 90.23 65.52 100.00 1.72 98.28 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear 91.38 87.93 100.00 77.01 87.93 0.00 99.43 6.90
RBF 89.08 87.36 100.00 75.86 88.51 0.00 100.00 5.75
TABLE XV: Success of Type-II attacks in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with OTSU pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - - - 37.36 0.57 45.98 0.00
skilled - - - - 38.73 1.73 46.24 1.16
RBF random - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Baseline Linear random 2.87 0.57 98.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 40.80 31.03 100.00 12.07 1.15 0.00 1.15 0.00
RBF random 1.72 0.57 95.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 34.48 24.14 100.00 14.37 1.72 0.00 1.72 0.00
SigNet Ens Adv. Linear random 1.72 1.15 93.10 7.47 0.00 0.00 1.72 0.00
skilled 29.31 22.99 100.00 21.84 0.57 0.00 2.87 0.57
RBF random 2.30 1.15 93.10 12.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 22.99 14.94 100.00 27.59 0.57 0.00 0.57 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear random 1.72 1.15 98.28 45.40 0.00 0.00 1.72 0.00
skilled 48.85 43.10 100.00 77.01 0.57 0.00 2.87 0.57
RBF random 2.30 1.72 97.70 62.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 45.98 40.23 100.00 84.48 0.57 0.00 0.57 0.00
• Knowledge of noise-removal: In section VI-E, we con-
sidered a pre-processing step to remove noise, that is
effective (to some extent) in many scenarios. We note,
however, that this cannot be considered a robust defense,
and that if the adversary is aware of it, it can use
this information as part of generating the adversarial
images (e.g. knowing that a threshold τ is used, consider
adding only pixels with intensity larger than τ ). This still
increases the difficulty for gradient-based methods, since
the problem becomes discontinuous (the pixel intensities
can be 0 or greater than τ ).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated the impact of adversarial exam-
ples on biometric systems, in particular by identifying threats
to Offline Handwritten Signature Verification under the point
of view of Adversarial Machine Learning. Our experiments
indicate that the issue of adversarial examples present new
threats to such systems in several scenarios, including both
systems using handcrafted feature extractors and systems that
learn directly from image pixels. In particular, we identify
that Type-I attacks (changing a genuine signature so that it
is rejected by the system) were successful is all systems
investigated, even in a limited knowledge scenario, where the
attacker does not have access to the signatures used for training
the writer-dependent classifiers. The results in this scenario
confirm previous findings that attacks transfer across different
CNN classifiers [4], and show that this transferability is also
present on attacks on systems using a handcrafted feature
extractor (CLBP). We found, however, that transferability is
greatly reduced when the CNN is trained with a different
set of users (rather than a dijsoint set of samples from the
same classes, as investigated in [4]). We identified that Type-
II attacks (changing a forgery to be accepted as genuine) are
much harder to craft, obtaining lower success rates overall,
and requiring larger amounts of noise for the strong gradient-
based method. This contrasts with results in object recognition
literature, where successful attacks (even in a targeted setting)
are reported with much lower noise (less than 3 orders of
magnitude), that are commonly visually imperceptible. [8]
Lastly, we investigated some countermeasures for this prob-
lem, and confirmed previous findings that the Madry defense
[10] increase the amount of noise necessary to generate
adversarial images. In this paper, we show that this defense is
effective even when only applied on the feature learning phase,
with no changes to the subsequent WD classifier training.
We do note, however, that in spite of the increased amount
of noise required, a strong attack (Carlini) is able to find
adversarial examples most of the time. Our experiments with
noise reduction show that this can reduce the success rate of
attacks when the attacker is not aware of the defense, although
we reiterate that this cannot be considered a robust defense
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(the adversary can incorporate this knowledge on the attack
generation process). A definitive solution for this issue is yet
an open research problem. Exploring the nature of the signal
(a pen trajectory in 2D space) as part of the defense can be a
promising direction for defenses. Another interesting area for
future work is analyzing the impact of physical attacks (e.g.
by printing adversarial noise on top of a signature).
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A. CNN architectures
In this paper, we used the SigNet architecture [34] for
the CNN-based experiments. This architecture is listed in
Table XVI. Additionally, as base models for the Ensemble
Adversarial Training [7], we trained two models based on
similar architectures: SigNet-thin, that has a smaller amount
of channels in the convolutional layers (described in Table
XVII) and SigNet-smaller that has less layers (described in
Table XVIII). In all cases, M refer to the number of users
(531 in the PK and LK1 experiments, and 264 in the LK2
experiments).
TABLE XVI: SigNet architecture
Layer Size Other Parameters
Input 1x150x220
Convolution (C1) 96x11x11 stride = 4, pad=0
Pooling 96x3x3 stride = 2
Convolution (C2) 256x5x5 stride = 1, pad=2
Pooling 256x3x3 stride = 2
Convolution (C3) 384x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Convolution (C4) 384x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Convolution (C5) 256x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Pooling 256x3x3 stride = 2
Fully Connected (FC6) 2048
Fully Connected (FC7) 2048
Fully Connected + Softmax M
B. Results on each dataset
Results on the MCYT dataset for different knowledge
scenarios are shown in Tables XIX to XXVI. Results with
countermeasures are shown in tables XXVII to XXX. Results
with noise removal are shown in tables XXXI and XXXII.
Results on the CEDAR dataset for different knowledge
scenarios are shown in Tables XXXIII to XL. Results with
countermeasures are shown in tables XLI to XLIV. Results
with noise removal are shown in tables XLV and XLVI.
Results on the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset for different
knowledge scenarios are shown in Tables XLVII to LIV.
Results with countermeasures are shown in tables LV to LVIII.
Results with noise removal are shown in tables LIX and LX.
TABLE XVII: SigNet-thin architecture
Layer Size Other Parameters
Input 1x150x220
Convolution (C1) 96x11x11 stride = 4, pad=0
Pooling 96x3x3 stride = 2
Convolution (C2) 128x5x5 stride = 1, pad=2
Pooling 128x3x3 stride = 2
Convolution (C3) 128x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Convolution (C4) 128x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Convolution (C5) 128x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Pooling 128x3x3 stride = 2
Fully Connected (FC6) 1024
Fully Connected (FC7) 1024
Fully Connected + Softmax M
TABLE XVIII: SigNet-smaller architecture
Layer Size Other Parameters
Input 1x150x220
Convolution (C1) 96x11x11 stride = 4, pad=0
Pooling 96x3x3 stride = 2
Convolution (C2) 256x5x5 stride = 1, pad=2
Pooling 256x3x3 stride = 2
Convolution (C3) 384x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Convolution (C4) 256x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Pooling 256x3x3 stride = 2
Fully Connected (FC5) 2048
Fully Connected + Softmax M
Results on the GPDS dataset for different knowledge sce-
narios are shown in Tables LXI to LXVIII. Results with
countermeasures are shown in tables LXIX to LXXII. Results
with noise removal are shown in tables LXXIII and LXXIV.
TABLE XIX: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the MCYT
dataset(% of attacks that transformed a genuine signature in a
forgery)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 55.56 75.00
CLBP RBF - - 100.00 100.00
SigNet Linear 97.22 100.00 97.22 100.00
SigNet RBF 91.67 100.00 97.22 100.00
TABLE XX: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for
successful Type-I attacks on the MCYT dataset
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 0.36 2.34
CLBP RBF - - 0.36 10−9
SigNet Linear 4.19 2.08 7.37 4.43
SigNet RBF 4.22 2.17 6.80 4.16
TABLE XXI: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the MCYT
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a genuine
signature)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 45.95 48.65
skilled - - 45.95 48.65
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 40.54 100.00 2.70 2.70
SigNet RBF random 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 29.73 100.00 2.70 2.70
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TABLE XXII: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for
successful Type-II attacks on the MCYT dataset
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 0.45 0.47
skilled - - 0.53 0.67
SigNet Linear random - 7.78 - -
skilled 4.29 4.13 1.72 0.52
SigNet RBF random - 8.53 - -
skilled 4.24 4.54 0.94 0.27
TABLE XXIII: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the MCYT
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a genuine signature in
a forgery) (Limited Knowledge)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 38.89 41.67
CLBP RBF - - 77.78 77.78
SigNet Linear 88.89 80.56 52.78 44.44
SigNet RBF 88.89 86.11 55.56 50.00
TABLE XXIV: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the MCYT
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a genuine
signature) (Limited Knowledge)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 29.73 35.14
skilled - - 27.03 29.73
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 0.00 54.05 0.00 0.00
skilled 21.62 78.38 2.70 0.00
SigNet RBF random 0.00 78.38 0.00 0.00
skilled 24.32 86.49 2.70 0.00
TABLE XXV: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the MCYT
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a genuine signature in
a forgery) (Limited Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
SigNet Linear 37.84 8.11 40.54 18.92
SigNet RBF 43.24 10.81 40.54 18.92
TABLE XXVI: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the MCYT
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a genuine
signature) (Limited Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
SigNet Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 0.00 2.70 0.00 0.00
SigNet RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 5.41 2.70 0.00 0.00
TABLE XXVII: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the MCYT
dataset considering different defenses and attacker knowledge
scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
Baseline Linear 100.00 86.49 37.84 100.00 75.68 8.11
RBF 100.00 89.19 43.24 100.00 81.08 10.81
Ens. Adv. Linear 70.27 64.86 16.22 100.00 89.19 8.11
RBF 72.97 59.46 16.22 100.00 86.49 5.41
Madry Linear 67.57 45.95 8.11 100.00 78.38 2.70
RBF 56.76 48.65 8.11 100.00 86.49 0.00
TABLE XXVIII: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise)
for Type-I attacks on the MCYT dataset, considering different
defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear 4.25 4.29 4.46 2.03 2.05 2.22
RBF 4.29 4.32 4.49 2.16 2.15 2.52
ensadv Linear 4.58 4.52 4.38 2.19 2.33 2.05
RBF 4.55 4.50 4.34 2.35 2.48 2.23
madry Linear 4.88 4.90 4.05 4.94 4.96 1.95
RBF 4.87 4.90 4.07 5.26 5.54 -
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TABLE XXIX: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the MCYT dataset considering different defenses and attacker knowledge
scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 51.35 0.00
skilled 35.14 32.43 0.00 100.00 67.57 2.70
RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 70.27 0.00
skilled 35.14 29.73 5.41 100.00 83.78 2.70
ensadv Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.30 45.95 0.00
skilled 29.73 13.51 0.00 100.00 78.38 0.00
RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.30 70.27 0.00
skilled 24.32 21.62 0.00 100.00 83.78 0.00
madry Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 54.05 0.00
skilled 35.14 27.03 2.70 100.00 78.38 2.70
RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 78.38 0.00
skilled 35.14 27.03 5.41 100.00 94.59 5.41
TABLE XXX: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for Type-II attacks on the MCYT dataset, considering different
defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear random - - - 7.02 7.00 -
skilled 4.41 4.42 - 3.69 3.97 3.56
RBF random - - - 7.89 8.28 -
skilled 4.39 4.45 4.75 4.22 4.39 2.26
ensadv Linear random - - - 12.41 11.93 -
skilled 4.49 4.41 - 6.77 7.11 -
RBF random - - - 13.05 13.66 -
skilled 4.51 4.49 - 7.68 7.23 -
madry Linear random - - - 15.01 15.83 -
skilled 4.91 4.99 4.31 8.91 9.16 3.73
RBF random - - - 15.79 16.14 -
skilled 4.94 5.00 4.10 9.85 9.90 3.68
TABLE XXXI: Success of Type-I attacks on the MCYT dataset in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with OTSU
pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier
CLBP Linear - - - - 55.56 8.33 75.00 2.78
RBF - - - - 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Baseline Linear 100.00 67.57 100.00 21.62 94.59 0.00 100.00 0.00
RBF 100.00 62.16 100.00 24.32 97.30 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Ens. Adv. Linear 70.27 43.24 100.00 0.00 91.89 0.00 100.00 0.00
RBF 72.97 35.14 100.00 0.00 94.59 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear 67.57 59.46 100.00 56.76 64.86 0.00 97.30 2.70
RBF 56.76 51.35 100.00 59.46 67.57 0.00 100.00 2.70
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TABLE XXXII: Success of Type-II attacks on the MCYT dataset in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with OTSU
pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - - - 45.95 0.00 48.65 0.00
skilled - - - - 45.95 0.00 48.65 2.70
RBF random - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Baseline Linear random 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 35.14 24.32 100.00 16.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBF random 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 35.14 24.32 100.00 16.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Ens. Adv. Linear random 0.00 0.00 97.30 10.81 0.00 0.00 5.41 0.00
skilled 29.73 13.51 100.00 21.62 0.00 0.00 5.41 0.00
RBF random 0.00 0.00 97.30 10.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 24.32 10.81 100.00 27.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear random 0.00 0.00 100.00 56.76 0.00 0.00 5.41 0.00
skilled 35.14 35.14 100.00 75.68 0.00 0.00 5.41 2.70
RBF random 0.00 0.00 100.00 72.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 35.14 29.73 100.00 81.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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TABLE XXXIII: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the CEDAR
dataset(% of attacks that transformed a genuine signature in a
forgery)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 70.37 85.19
CLBP RBF - - 100.00 100.00
SigNet Linear 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SigNet RBF 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE XXXIV: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise)
for successful Type-I attacks on the CEDAR dataset
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 0.36 0.69
CLBP RBF - - 0.36 10−9
SigNet Linear 3.83 0.85 4.69 2.43
SigNet RBF 3.81 0.88 3.99 2.09
TABLE XXXV: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the CEDAR
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a genuine
signature)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 25.93 44.44
skilled - - 34.62 46.15
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 30.77 100.00 3.85 7.69
SigNet RBF random 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 26.92 100.00 0.00 0.00
TABLE XXXVI: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise)
for successful Type-II attacks on the CEDAR dataset
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 0.35 0.72
skilled - - 0.38 1.12
SigNet Linear random - 3.38 - -
skilled 3.96 2.16 1.30 0.88
SigNet RBF random - 4.05 - -
skilled 3.73 2.58 - -
TABLE XXXVII: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the
CEDAR dataset (% of attacks that transformed a genuine
signature in a forgery) (Limited Knowledge)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 33.33 33.33
CLBP RBF - - 85.19 85.19
SigNet Linear 100.00 77.78 62.96 40.74
SigNet RBF 100.00 96.30 62.96 48.15
TABLE XXXVIII: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the
CEDAR dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a
genuine signature) (Limited Knowledge)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 18.52 14.81
skilled - - 15.38 15.38
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 0.00 37.04 0.00 0.00
skilled 30.77 65.38 3.85 0.00
SigNet RBF random 0.00 70.37 0.00 0.00
skilled 23.08 76.92 0.00 0.00
TABLE XXXIX: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the CEDAR
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a genuine signature in
a forgery) (Limited Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
SigNet Linear 70.37 3.70 55.56 25.93
SigNet RBF 74.07 11.11 59.26 22.22
TABLE XL: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the CEDAR
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a genuine
signature) (Limited Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
SigNet Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 0.00 0.00 3.70 3.70
SigNet RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 0.00 3.70 7.41 0.00
TABLE XLI: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the CEDAR
dataset considering different defenses and attacker knowledge
scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear 100.00 96.30 70.37 100.00 74.07 3.70
RBF 100.00 100.00 74.07 100.00 81.48 11.11
ensadv Linear 100.00 100.00 70.37 100.00 77.78 3.70
RBF 100.00 100.00 70.37 100.00 96.30 3.70
madry Linear 100.00 96.30 33.33 100.00 77.78 0.00
RBF 100.00 100.00 25.93 100.00 92.59 0.00
TABLE XLII: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for
Type-I attacks on the CEDAR dataset, considering different
defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear 3.93 3.99 4.07 0.86 0.91 0.85
RBF 3.96 3.97 4.07 0.94 0.92 0.97
ensadv Linear 4.22 4.09 4.03 0.82 0.86 1.10
RBF 4.20 4.15 4.00 0.90 0.84 1.02
madry Linear 4.49 4.43 4.14 2.01 2.10 -
RBF 4.54 4.45 4.31 2.34 2.30 -
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TABLE XLIII: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the CEDAR dataset considering different defenses and attacker knowledge
scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear random 11.11 7.41 0.00 100.00 37.04 0.00
skilled 48.15 25.93 0.00 100.00 48.15 0.00
RBF random 11.11 7.41 0.00 100.00 70.37 0.00
skilled 40.74 37.04 0.00 100.00 74.07 3.70
ensadv Linear random 7.41 0.00 0.00 100.00 40.74 0.00
skilled 29.63 11.11 0.00 100.00 62.96 7.41
RBF random 11.11 0.00 0.00 100.00 66.67 0.00
skilled 22.22 14.81 0.00 100.00 77.78 3.70
madry Linear random 7.41 0.00 0.00 100.00 40.74 0.00
skilled 59.26 44.44 22.22 100.00 62.96 7.41
RBF random 3.70 0.00 0.00 100.00 81.48 0.00
skilled 55.56 37.04 11.11 100.00 81.48 7.41
TABLE XLIV: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for Type-II attacks on the CEDAR dataset, considering different
defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear random 3.93 3.75 - 3.50 4.49 -
skilled 4.03 3.85 - 2.04 1.60 -
RBF random 3.84 3.83 - 4.11 4.24 -
skilled 3.97 3.93 - 2.40 2.33 0.77
ensadv Linear random 4.43 - - 4.82 5.00 -
skilled 4.40 4.65 - 3.13 2.47 1.11
RBF random 4.28 - - 5.87 4.83 -
skilled 4.46 4.46 - 3.76 3.13 1.82
madry Linear random 4.55 - - 5.66 5.73 -
skilled 4.88 5.00 4.26 3.71 3.20 1.32
RBF random 4.09 - - 6.45 6.34 -
skilled 4.87 4.94 4.26 4.71 4.42 1.47
TABLE XLV: Success of Type-I attacks on the CEDAR dataset in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with OTSU
pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier
CLBP Linear - - - - 70.37 7.41 85.19 0.00
RBF - - - - 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Baseline Linear 100.00 100.00 100.00 11.11 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
RBF 100.00 100.00 100.00 14.81 96.30 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Ens. Adv. Linear 100.00 81.48 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
RBF 100.00 81.48 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear 100.00 100.00 100.00 85.19 100.00 0.00 100.00 3.70
RBF 100.00 100.00 100.00 81.48 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
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TABLE XLVI: Success of Type-II attacks on the CEDAR dataset in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with OTSU
pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - - - 25.93 0.00 44.44 0.00
skilled - - - - 34.62 0.00 46.15 3.85
RBF random - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Baseline Linear random 11.11 3.70 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 48.15 40.74 100.00 14.81 3.70 0.00 3.70 0.00
RBF random 11.11 3.70 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 40.74 29.63 100.00 22.22 7.41 0.00 7.41 0.00
SigNet Ens. Adv. Linear random 7.41 3.70 100.00 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 29.63 22.22 100.00 22.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBF random 11.11 3.70 100.00 14.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 22.22 11.11 100.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear random 7.41 3.70 100.00 25.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 59.26 55.56 100.00 81.48 3.70 0.00 3.70 0.00
RBF random 3.70 3.70 100.00 59.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 55.56 55.56 100.00 85.19 3.70 0.00 3.70 0.00
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TABLE XLVII: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the Brazilian
PUC-PR dataset(% of attacks that transformed a genuine
signature in a forgery)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 66.67 76.67
CLBP RBF - - 100.00 100.00
SigNet Linear 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SigNet RBF 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE XLVIII: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise)
for successful Type-I attacks on the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 0.36 0.37
CLBP RBF - - 0.36 10−9
SigNet Linear 3.92 1.03 5.10 2.75
SigNet RBF 3.89 1.05 4.46 2.51
TABLE XLIX: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the Brazilian
PUC-PR dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a
genuine signature)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 33.33 36.67
skilled - - 33.33 36.67
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 6.67 100.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 33.33 100.00 0.00 3.33
SigNet RBF random 3.33 100.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 10.00 100.00 3.33 3.33
TABLE L: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for
successful Type-II attacks on the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 0.36 0.60
skilled - - 0.36 0.19
SigNet Linear random 4.11 4.63 - -
skilled 4.26 2.01 - 0.27
SigNet RBF random 4.70 5.70 - -
skilled 4.19 2.45 3.92 1.30
TABLE LI: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the Brazilian
PUC-PR dataset (% of attacks that transformed a genuine
signature in a forgery) (Limited Knowledge)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 50.00 53.33
CLBP RBF - - 90.00 90.00
SigNet Linear 100.00 80.00 50.00 43.33
SigNet RBF 100.00 96.67 56.67 53.33
TABLE LII: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the Brazilian
PUC-PR dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a
genuine signature) (Limited Knowledge)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 26.67 33.33
skilled - - 23.33 26.67
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 23.33 83.33 0.00 0.00
SigNet RBF random 0.00 83.33 0.00 0.00
skilled 10.00 93.33 0.00 0.00
TABLE LIII: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the Brazilian
PUC-PR dataset (% of attacks that transformed a genuine
signature in a forgery) (Limited Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
SigNet Linear 80.00 10.00 43.33 13.33
SigNet RBF 83.33 10.00 56.67 20.00
TABLE LIV: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the Brazilian
PUC-PR dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a
genuine signature) (Limited Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
SigNet Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 0.00 3.33 0.00 0.00
TABLE LV: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the Brazilian
PUC-PR dataset considering different defenses and attacker
knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear 100.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 86.67 10.00
RBF 100.00 100.00 83.33 100.00 96.67 10.00
ensadv Linear 100.00 96.67 76.67 100.00 80.00 3.33
RBF 100.00 100.00 83.33 100.00 96.67 3.33
madry Linear 100.00 93.33 33.33 100.00 83.33 3.33
RBF 100.00 100.00 36.67 100.00 100.00 0.00
TABLE LVI: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for
Type-I attacks on the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset, considering
different defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear 4.09 4.06 4.24 0.96 0.97 1.18
RBF 4.09 4.00 4.11 1.03 1.04 1.27
ensadv Linear 4.28 4.26 4.15 0.94 0.92 1.51
RBF 4.31 4.35 4.12 0.98 0.97 1.59
madry Linear 4.57 4.54 4.39 2.16 2.35 0.83
RBF 4.57 4.64 4.18 2.41 2.55 -
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TABLE LVII: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset considering different defenses and attacker
knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear random 3.33 0.00 0.00 100.00 46.67 0.00
skilled 50.00 30.00 10.00 100.00 76.67 10.00
RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 80.00 0.00
skilled 30.00 26.67 0.00 100.00 93.33 3.33
ensadv Linear random 3.33 3.33 0.00 100.00 53.33 0.00
skilled 46.67 20.00 3.33 100.00 60.00 6.67
RBF random 3.33 0.00 0.00 100.00 96.67 0.00
skilled 23.33 16.67 3.33 100.00 100.00 3.33
madry Linear random 3.33 3.33 0.00 96.67 50.00 0.00
skilled 76.67 60.00 10.00 100.00 76.67 3.33
RBF random 10.00 3.33 0.00 96.67 93.33 0.00
skilled 66.67 56.67 10.00 100.00 93.33 0.00
TABLE LVIII: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for Type-II attacks on the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset, considering
different defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear random 4.63 - - 4.47 5.13 -
skilled 4.25 4.06 4.21 1.86 1.79 2.05
RBF random - - - 5.31 4.95 -
skilled 4.01 3.85 - 2.25 2.18 2.29
ensadv Linear random 4.66 4.82 - 6.83 7.46 -
skilled 4.53 4.60 3.86 2.86 2.84 1.51
RBF random 4.76 - - 8.27 8.16 -
skilled 4.62 4.60 3.84 3.89 3.69 2.45
madry Linear random 5.12 5.38 - 8.23 8.69 -
skilled 4.89 4.86 3.95 3.88 3.69 1.30
RBF random 4.79 5.28 - 9.41 9.67 -
skilled 4.86 4.74 4.27 4.96 4.73 -
TABLE LIX: Success of Type-I attacks on the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with
OTSU pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier
CLBP Linear - - - - 66.67 13.33 76.67 3.33
RBF - - - - 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Baseline Linear 100.00 100.00 100.00 10.00 90.00 0.00 100.00 6.67
RBF 100.00 96.67 100.00 23.33 100.00 0.00 96.67 0.00
SigNet Ens. Adv. Linear 100.00 93.33 100.00 6.67 96.67 0.00 100.00 0.00
RBF 100.00 93.33 100.00 3.33 96.67 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear 100.00 100.00 100.00 90.00 93.33 0.00 100.00 6.67
RBF 100.00 100.00 100.00 86.67 96.67 0.00 100.00 6.67
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TABLE LX: Success of Type-II attacks on the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with
OTSU pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - - - 33.33 0.00 36.67 0.00
skilled - - - - 33.33 0.00 36.67 0.00
RBF random - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Baseline Linear random 3.33 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 50.00 36.67 100.00 13.33 3.33 0.00 3.33 0.00
RBF random 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 30.00 26.67 100.00 16.67 3.33 0.00 3.33 0.00
SigNet Ens. Adv. Linear random 3.33 3.33 100.00 3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 46.67 43.33 100.00 20.00 3.33 0.00 6.67 0.00
RBF random 3.33 3.33 100.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 23.33 23.33 100.00 36.67 3.33 0.00 3.33 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear random 3.33 3.33 96.67 36.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 76.67 60.00 100.00 73.33 0.00 0.00 3.33 0.00
RBF random 10.00 6.67 96.67 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 66.67 56.67 100.00 90.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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TABLE LXI: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the GPDS-160
dataset(% of attacks that transformed a genuine signature in a
forgery)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 62.82 83.33
CLBP RBF - - 100.00 100.00
SigNet Linear 100.00 100.00 98.72 100.00
SigNet RBF 100.00 100.00 98.72 100.00
TABLE LXII: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for
successful Type-I attacks on the GPDS-160 dataset
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 0.46 1.99
CLBP RBF - - 0.36 10−9
SigNet Linear 4.09 1.30 5.52 3.22
SigNet RBF 4.13 1.36 5.12 3.00
TABLE LXIII: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the GPDS-
160 dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a
genuine signature)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 38.75 48.75
skilled - - 38.75 48.75
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 0.00 92.50 0.00 0.00
skilled 21.25 98.75 2.50 2.50
SigNet RBF random 0.00 88.75 0.00 0.00
skilled 16.25 100.00 1.25 1.25
TABLE LXIV: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for
successful Type-II attacks on the GPDS-160 dataset
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 0.37 1.80
skilled - - 0.39 1.51
SigNet Linear random - 6.78 - -
skilled 4.18 3.54 5.71 2.74
SigNet RBF random - 6.83 - -
skilled 4.11 3.98 4.66 1.96
TABLE LXV: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the GPDS-
160 dataset (% of attacks that transformed a genuine signature
in a forgery) (Limited Knowledge)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
CLBP Linear - - 44.87 44.87
CLBP RBF - - 80.77 80.77
SigNet Linear 98.72 80.77 46.15 37.18
SigNet RBF 100.00 91.03 50.00 44.87
TABLE LXVI: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the GPDS-
160 dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a
genuine signature) (Limited Knowledge)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - 23.75 28.75
skilled - - 21.25 27.50
CLBP RBF random - - 0.00 0.00
skilled - - 0.00 0.00
SigNet Linear random 0.00 45.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 20.00 66.25 1.25 0.00
SigNet RBF random 0.00 71.25 0.00 0.00
skilled 18.75 80.00 0.00 0.00
TABLE LXVII: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the GPDS
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a genuine signature in
a forgery) (Limited Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
Feature Classifier FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
SigNet Linear 60.00 6.25 52.50 20.00
SigNet RBF 63.75 7.50 51.25 17.50
TABLE LXVIII: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the GPDS
dataset (% of attacks that transformed a forgery in a genuine
signature) (Limited Knowledge #2)
Attack Type
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
Features Classifier Forgery Type
SigNet Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
TABLE LXIX: Success rate of Type-I attacks on the GPDS
dataset considering different defenses and attacker knowledge
scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear 100.00 97.50 60.00 100.00 77.50 6.25
RBF 100.00 100.00 63.75 100.00 85.00 7.50
ensadv Linear 95.00 86.25 38.75 100.00 76.25 3.75
RBF 91.25 83.75 38.75 100.00 87.50 7.50
madry Linear 96.25 92.50 22.50 100.00 68.75 1.25
RBF 96.25 93.75 21.25 100.00 85.00 1.25
TABLE LXX: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise)
for Type-I attacks on the GPDS dataset, considering different
defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear 4.25 4.27 4.37 1.27 1.29 1.07
RBF 4.28 4.32 4.42 1.34 1.33 1.32
ensadv Linear 4.39 4.33 4.31 1.29 1.33 2.02
RBF 4.38 4.33 4.36 1.37 1.36 1.53
madry Linear 4.88 4.85 4.28 3.17 3.26 1.99
RBF 4.90 4.85 4.34 3.46 3.45 2.19
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TABLE LXXI: Success rate of Type-II attacks on the GPDS dataset considering different defenses and attacker knowledge
scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear random 1.25 0.00 0.00 97.50 38.75 0.00
skilled 37.50 28.75 1.25 100.00 68.75 0.00
RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 91.25 62.50 0.00
skilled 33.75 23.75 1.25 100.00 83.75 0.00
ensadv Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 86.25 35.00 0.00
skilled 22.50 15.00 1.25 100.00 60.00 2.50
RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 86.25 60.00 0.00
skilled 22.50 16.25 1.25 100.00 80.00 2.50
madry Linear random 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.50 42.50 0.00
skilled 41.25 33.75 5.00 100.00 73.75 2.50
RBF random 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.25 66.25 0.00
skilled 40.00 35.00 3.75 100.00 85.00 1.25
TABLE LXXII: Distortion (RMSE of the adversarial noise) for Type-II attacks on the GPDS dataset, considering different
defenses and attacker knowledge scenarios
Attack Type and Knowledge scenario
FGM Carlini
Defense Classifier Forgery Type PK LK1 LK2 PK LK1 LK2
baseline Linear random 3.40 - - 6.92 5.58 -
skilled 4.17 4.12 4.32 3.40 2.78 -
RBF random - - - 6.64 6.06 -
skilled 4.07 3.99 4.41 3.60 3.32 -
ensadv Linear random - - - 8.88 9.24 -
skilled 4.59 4.61 4.32 4.98 3.89 1.67
RBF random - - - 9.48 9.33 -
skilled 4.66 4.66 4.31 5.54 4.74 2.14
madry Linear random - - - 11.55 10.81 -
skilled 4.90 4.92 4.10 6.62 5.87 1.99
RBF random - - - 11.98 11.97 -
skilled 4.95 4.91 3.98 7.22 6.63 1.67
TABLE LXXIII: Success of Type-I attacks on the GPDS dataset in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with OTSU
pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier
CLBP Linear - - - - 62.82 8.97 83.33 5.13
RBF - - - - 100.00 1.28 100.00 0.00
SigNet Baseline Linear 100.00 90.00 100.00 22.50 98.75 1.25 100.00 1.25
RBF 100.00 88.75 100.00 23.75 98.75 0.00 98.75 1.25
SigNet Ens. Adv. Linear 95.00 63.75 100.00 3.75 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
RBF 91.25 63.75 100.00 2.50 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear 96.25 92.50 100.00 78.75 92.50 0.00 100.00 10.00
RBF 96.25 95.00 100.00 77.50 91.25 0.00 100.00 8.75
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TABLE LXXIV: Success of Type-II attacks on the GPDS dataset in a PK scenario, with no pre-processing and with OTSU
pre-processing
Attack Type and Preprocessing
FGM Carlini Anneal Decision
None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU None OTSU
Feature Classifier Forgery Type
CLBP Linear random - - - - 38.75 1.25 48.75 0.00
skilled - - - - 38.75 3.75 48.75 0.00
RBF random - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Baseline Linear random 1.25 0.00 97.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 37.50 28.75 100.00 8.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBF random 0.00 0.00 91.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 33.75 21.25 100.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Ens. Adv. Linear random 0.00 0.00 86.25 8.75 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.00
skilled 22.50 20.00 100.00 22.50 0.00 0.00 1.25 1.25
RBF random 0.00 0.00 86.25 11.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 22.50 15.00 100.00 22.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SigNet Madry Linear random 0.00 0.00 97.50 50.00 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.00
skilled 41.25 36.25 100.00 77.50 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.00
RBF random 0.00 0.00 96.25 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
skilled 40.00 33.75 100.00 83.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
